diff --git a/.github/workflows/build_master.yml b/.github/workflows/build_master.yml
index 8c7cd5368..e19ffef17 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/build_master.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/build_master.yml
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
       
       # Build the mdBook
       - name: Build mdBook
-        run: MDBOOK_BOOK__LANGUAGE=en mdbook build || (echo "Error logs" && cat hacktricks-preprocessor-error.log && echo "" && echo "" && echo "Debug logs" && (cat hacktricks-preprocessor.log | tail -n 20) && exit 1); ls -la; ls -la book
+        run: MDBOOK_BOOK__LANGUAGE=en mdbook build || (echo "Error logs" && cat hacktricks-preprocessor-error.log && echo "" && echo "" && echo "Debug logs" && (cat hacktricks-preprocessor.log | tail -n 20) && exit 1)
       
       - name: Update searchindex.js in repo
         run: |
diff --git a/src/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/abusing-roles-clusterroles-in-kubernetes/README.md b/src/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/abusing-roles-clusterroles-in-kubernetes/README.md
index f19f9ff19..57cbc2ff0 100644
--- a/src/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/abusing-roles-clusterroles-in-kubernetes/README.md
+++ b/src/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/abusing-roles-clusterroles-in-kubernetes/README.md
@@ -430,6 +430,68 @@ While an attacker in possession of a token with read permissions requires the ex
 
 The token is generated from a limited 27-character set (`bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxz2456789`), rather than the full alphanumeric range. This limitation reduces the total possible combinations to 14,348,907 (27^5). Consequently, an attacker could feasibly execute a brute-force attack to deduce the token in a matter of hours, potentially leading to privilege escalation by accessing sensitive service accounts.
 
+### EncrpytionConfiguration in clear text
+
+It's possible to find clear text keys to encrypt data at rest in this type of object like:
+
+```yaml
+# From https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data/
+
+#
+# CAUTION: this is an example configuration.
+#          Do not use this for your own cluster!
+#
+
+apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1
+kind: EncryptionConfiguration
+resources:
+  - resources:
+      - secrets
+      - configmaps
+      - pandas.awesome.bears.example # a custom resource API
+    providers:
+      # This configuration does not provide data confidentiality. The first
+      # configured provider is specifying the "identity" mechanism, which
+      # stores resources as plain text.
+      #
+      - identity: {} # plain text, in other words NO encryption
+      - aesgcm:
+          keys:
+            - name: key1
+              secret: c2VjcmV0IGlzIHNlY3VyZQ==
+            - name: key2
+              secret: dGhpcyBpcyBwYXNzd29yZA==
+      - aescbc:
+          keys:
+            - name: key1
+              secret: c2VjcmV0IGlzIHNlY3VyZQ==
+            - name: key2
+              secret: dGhpcyBpcyBwYXNzd29yZA==
+      - secretbox:
+          keys:
+            - name: key1
+              secret: YWJjZGVmZ2hpamtsbW5vcHFyc3R1dnd4eXoxMjM0NTY=
+  - resources:
+      - events
+    providers:
+      - identity: {} # do not encrypt Events even though *.* is specified below
+  - resources:
+      - '*.apps' # wildcard match requires Kubernetes 1.27 or later
+    providers:
+      - aescbc:
+          keys:
+          - name: key2
+            secret: c2VjcmV0IGlzIHNlY3VyZSwgb3IgaXMgaXQ/Cg==
+  - resources:
+      - '*.*' # wildcard match requires Kubernetes 1.27 or later
+    providers:
+      - aescbc:
+          keys:
+          - name: key3
+            secret: c2VjcmV0IGlzIHNlY3VyZSwgSSB0aGluaw==
+```
+
+
 ### Certificate Signing Requests
 
 If you have the verbs **`create`** in the resource `certificatesigningrequests` ( or at least in `certificatesigningrequests/nodeClient`). You can **create** a new CeSR of a **new node.**
diff --git a/src/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-network-attacks.md b/src/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-network-attacks.md
index baf5ca34a..14a0fea49 100644
--- a/src/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-network-attacks.md
+++ b/src/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/kubernetes-network-attacks.md
@@ -287,6 +287,10 @@ Check more information about this attack in:
 abusing-roles-clusterroles-in-kubernetes/README.md
 {{/ref}}
 
+## Abusing exposed kubernetes management services
+
+Services like Apache NiFi, Kubeflow, Argo Workflows, Weave Scope, and the Kubernetes dashboard are often exposed either to the internet or within the kubernetes network. An attacker that manage to **find any platform used to manage kubernetes and access it** can abuse it to get access to the kubernetes API and perform actions like creating new pods, modifying existing ones, or even deleting them.
+
 ## Enumerating kubernetes network policies
 
 Get configured **networkpolicies**: