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@@ -141,3 +141,4 @@ From a **white box security** review, you would need the **System Auditor role**
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@@ -177,3 +177,4 @@ If they are used for example inside a a bash command, you could perform a comman
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@@ -113,3 +113,4 @@ AUTH_ROLE_PUBLIC = 'Admin'
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@@ -45,3 +45,4 @@ These are the default permissions per default role:
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@@ -390,3 +390,4 @@ You can also pass these as environment variables `ATLANTIS_WEB_BASIC_AUTH=true`
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@@ -257,3 +257,4 @@ jobs:
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@@ -136,3 +136,4 @@ cloudflare-zero-trust-network.md
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@@ -135,3 +135,4 @@ TODO
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@@ -63,3 +63,4 @@ TODO
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@@ -35,3 +35,4 @@ concourse-enumeration-and-attacks.md
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@@ -40,3 +40,4 @@ In order to execute tasks concourse must have some workers. These workers **regi
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@@ -444,3 +444,4 @@ Accept-Encoding: gzip.
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@@ -153,3 +153,4 @@ Check a YAML pipeline example that triggers on new commits to master in [https:/
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@@ -140,3 +140,4 @@ If you are inside the server you can also **use the `gitea` binary** to access/m
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@@ -105,3 +105,4 @@ Different protections can be applied to a branch (like to master):
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@@ -246,3 +246,4 @@ For more info check [https://www.chainguard.dev/unchained/what-the-fork-imposter
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@@ -583,3 +583,4 @@ The following tools are useful to find Github Action workflows and even find vul
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@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
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@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
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@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
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@@ -58,3 +58,4 @@ And the latest one use a short sha-1 that is bruteforceable.
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@@ -257,3 +257,4 @@ Different protections can be applied to a branch (like to master):
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@@ -414,3 +414,4 @@ println(hudson.util.Secret.decrypt("{...}"))
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@@ -96,3 +96,4 @@ According to [**the docs**](https://www.jenkins.io/blog/2019/02/21/credentials-m
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@@ -107,3 +107,4 @@ The example curl command provided demonstrates how to make a request to Jenkins
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@@ -91,3 +91,4 @@ for (c in creds) {
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@@ -41,3 +41,4 @@ If you can access the configuration file of some pipeline configured you could j
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@@ -38,3 +38,4 @@ If you are not executing a reverse shell but a simple command you can **see the
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@@ -65,3 +65,4 @@ msf> use exploit/multi/http/jenkins_script_console
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@@ -116,3 +116,4 @@ okta-hardening.md
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@@ -201,3 +201,4 @@ Here you can download Okta agents to sync Okta with other technologies.
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@@ -106,3 +106,4 @@ Check this interesting article about the top 10 CI/CD risks according to Cider:
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@@ -860,3 +860,4 @@ Granting excessive permissions to team members and external collaborators can le
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@@ -165,3 +165,4 @@ It's possible to **store secrets** in supabase also which will be **accessible b
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@@ -314,3 +314,4 @@ brew install terrascan
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@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ Github PRs are welcome explaining how to (ab)use those platforms from an attacke
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@@ -67,3 +67,4 @@ If an attacker ends in an environment which uses **TravisCI enterprise** (more i
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@@ -94,3 +94,4 @@ The amount of deployed TCI Worker and build environment OS images will determine
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@@ -439,3 +439,4 @@ An **Access Group** in Vercel is a collection of projects and team members with
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