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Update whitepaper
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@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ The server needs to store the following variables:
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* `spkm`
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* `biscuit_key` – Randomly chosen key used to encrypt biscuits
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* `biscuit_ctr` – Retransmission protection for biscuits
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* `cookie_secret`- A randomized cookie secret to derive cookies sent to peer when under load. This secret changes every 120 seconds
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Not mandated per se, but required in practice:
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@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@ The initiator stores the following local state for each ongoing handshake:
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* `ck` – The chaining key
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* `eski` – The initiator's ephemeral secret key
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* `epki` – The initiator's ephemeral public key
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* `cookie_value`- Cookie value sent by an initiator peer under load, used to compute cookie field in outgoing handshake to peer under load. This value expires 120 seconds from when a peer sends this value using the CookieReply message
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The responder stores no state. While the responder has access to all of the above variables except for `eski`, the responder discards them after generating the RespHello message. Instead, the responder state is contained inside a cookie called a biscuit. This value is returned to the responder inside the InitConf packet. The biscuit consists of:
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