chore: Move kems out of rosenpass crate

This commit is contained in:
Karolin Varner
2023-12-01 19:45:10 +01:00
committed by Karolin Varner
parent 101c9bf4b3
commit 972e82b35f
22 changed files with 259 additions and 242 deletions

80
oqs/src/kem_macro.rs Normal file
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macro_rules! oqs_kem {
($name:ident) => { ::paste::paste!{
mod [< $name:snake >] {
use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
use rosenpass_util::result::Guaranteed;
pub enum [< $name:camel >] {}
/// # Panic & Safety
///
/// This Trait impl calls unsafe [oqs_sys] functions, that write to byte
/// slices only identified using raw pointers. It must be ensured that the raw
/// pointers point into byte slices of sufficient length, to avoid UB through
/// overwriting of arbitrary data. This is ensured through assertions in the
/// implementation.
///
/// __Note__: This requirement is stricter than necessary, it would suffice
/// to only check that the buffers are big enough, allowing them to be even
/// bigger. However, from a correctness point of view it does not make sense to
/// allow bigger buffers.
impl Kem for [< $name:camel >] {
type Error = ::std::convert::Infallible;
const SK_LEN: usize = ::oqs_sys::kem::[<OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ length_secret_key >] as usize;
const PK_LEN: usize = ::oqs_sys::kem::[<OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ length_public_key >] as usize;
const CT_LEN: usize = ::oqs_sys::kem::[<OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ length_ciphertext >] as usize;
const SHK_LEN: usize = ::oqs_sys::kem::[<OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ length_shared_secret >] as usize;
fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Guaranteed<()> {
assert_eq!(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN);
assert_eq!(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN);
unsafe {
oqs_call!(
::oqs_sys::kem::[< OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ keypair >],
pk.as_mut_ptr(),
sk.as_mut_ptr()
);
}
Ok(())
}
fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Guaranteed<()> {
assert_eq!(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN);
assert_eq!(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN);
assert_eq!(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN);
unsafe {
oqs_call!(
::oqs_sys::kem::[< OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ encaps >],
ct.as_mut_ptr(),
shk.as_mut_ptr(),
pk.as_ptr()
);
}
Ok(())
}
fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Guaranteed<()> {
assert_eq!(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN);
assert_eq!(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN);
assert_eq!(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN);
unsafe {
oqs_call!(
::oqs_sys::kem::[< OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ decaps >],
shk.as_mut_ptr(),
ct.as_ptr(),
sk.as_ptr()
);
}
Ok(())
}
}
}
pub use [< $name:snake >] :: [< $name:camel >];
}}
}

21
oqs/src/lib.rs Normal file
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macro_rules! oqs_call {
($name:path, $($args:expr),*) => {{
use oqs_sys::common::OQS_STATUS::*;
match $name($($args),*) {
OQS_SUCCESS => {}, // nop
OQS_EXTERNAL_LIB_ERROR_OPENSSL => {
panic!("OpenSSL error in liboqs' {}.", stringify!($name));
},
OQS_ERROR => {
panic!("Unknown error in liboqs' {}.", stringify!($name));
}
}
}};
($name:ident) => { oqs_call!($name, ) };
}
#[macro_use]
mod kem_macro;
oqs_kem!(kyber_512);
oqs_kem!(classic_mceliece_460896);