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18 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
SirBroccoli
9d8a14d2ec Merge pull request #545 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-linpeas-ECS_on_EC2__Covering_Gaps_in_IMDS_Ha_20251229_015718
[LINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: ECS on EC2 Covering Gaps in IMDS Hardeni...
2026-01-17 16:25:39 +01:00
SirBroccoli
9c49dfd2bb Merge pull request #529 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-Pwning_ASUS_DriverHub__MSI_Center__A_20251207_130236
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: Pwning ASUS DriverHub, MSI Center, Acer ...
2026-01-17 16:06:06 +01:00
SirBroccoli
9acc2ef61d Merge pull request #540 from peass-ng/update_PEASS-winpeas-The_Windows_Registry_Adventure__Part_20251217_014635
[WINPEAS] Add privilege escalation check: The Windows Registry Adventure, Part 8 E...
2026-01-17 16:05:46 +01:00
Carlos Polop
e7663381f2 Merge master into PR 529 and resolve ServicesInfo conflict 2026-01-17 15:52:44 +01:00
Carlos Polop
ce5bd84575 Merge ECS IMDS checks into ECS module 2026-01-17 15:48:55 +01:00
SirBroccoli
c447ca993d Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-The_Windows_Registry_Adventure__Part_20251217_014635 2026-01-17 15:45:17 +01:00
Carlos Polop
2f44379713 Fix registry hive resolution in ACL scanner 2026-01-17 15:33:09 +01:00
Carlos Polop
0ed7a39a7d Fix unassigned out vars in OEM pipe check 2026-01-17 15:21:50 +01:00
Carlos Polop
1cdd473d79 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-Pwning_ASUS_DriverHub__MSI_Center__A_20251207_130236 2026-01-17 13:36:49 +01:00
Carlos Polop
c14f9aeb30 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-winpeas-The_Windows_Registry_Adventure__Part_20251217_014635 2026-01-17 13:36:22 +01:00
Carlos Polop
7016e5a0b4 Merge branch 'master' into update_PEASS-linpeas-ECS_on_EC2__Covering_Gaps_in_IMDS_Ha_20251229_015718 2026-01-17 13:36:02 +01:00
Carlos Polop
7a5aa8dcae chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:40 +01:00
Carlos Polop
aca58f36b9 chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:17:14 +01:00
Carlos Polop
fa58c6688b chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:16:54 +01:00
Carlos Polop
3aa04a53fc chore: trigger CI 2026-01-16 18:15:20 +01:00
HackTricks News Bot
e77867b2d3 Add linpeas privilege escalation checks from: ECS on EC2: Covering Gaps in IMDS Hardening 2025-12-29 02:02:46 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
3268701ed6 Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: The Windows Registry Adventure, Part 8: Exploitation of Hive-based Memory Corrup 2025-12-17 02:00:18 +00:00
HackTricks News Bot
6c75f10fae Add winpeas privilege escalation checks from: Pwning ASUS DriverHub, MSI Center, Acer Control Centre and Razer Synapse 4 2025-12-07 13:22:49 +00:00
9 changed files with 1020 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# Title: Cloud - AWS ECS
# ID: CL_AWS_ECS
# Author: Carlos Polop
# Last Update: 22-08-2023
# Last Update: 17-01-2026
# Description: AWS ECS Enumeration
# License: GNU GPL
# Version: 1.0
# Functions Used: check_aws_ecs, exec_with_jq, print_2title, print_3title
# Global Variables: $aws_ecs_metadata_uri, $aws_ecs_service_account_uri, $is_aws_ecs
# Initial Functions: check_aws_ecs
# Generated Global Variables: $aws_ecs_req
# Generated Global Variables: $aws_ecs_req, $aws_exec_env, $ecs_task_metadata, $launch_type, $network_modes, $imds_tool, $imds_token, $imds_roles, $imds_http_code, $ecs_block_line, $ecs_host_line, $iptables_cmd, $docker_rules, $first_role
# Fat linpeas: 0
# Small linpeas: 1
@@ -44,5 +44,146 @@ if [ "$is_aws_ecs" = "Yes" ]; then
else
echo "I couldn't find AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI env var to get IAM role info (the task is running without a task role probably)"
fi
print_3title "ECS task metadata hints"
aws_exec_env=$(printenv AWS_EXECUTION_ENV 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$aws_exec_env" ]; then
printf "AWS_EXECUTION_ENV=%s\n" "$aws_exec_env"
fi
ecs_task_metadata=""
if [ "$aws_ecs_metadata_uri" ]; then
ecs_task_metadata=$(eval $aws_ecs_req "$aws_ecs_metadata_uri/task" 2>/dev/null)
fi
if [ "$ecs_task_metadata" ]; then
launch_type=$(printf "%s" "$ecs_task_metadata" | grep -oE '"LaunchType":"[^"]+"' | head -n 1 | cut -d '"' -f4)
if [ "$launch_type" ]; then
printf "ECS LaunchType reported: %s\n" "$launch_type"
fi
network_modes=$(printf "%s" "$ecs_task_metadata" | grep -oE '"NetworkMode":"[^"]+"' | cut -d '"' -f4 | sort -u | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ "$network_modes" ]; then
printf "Reported NetworkMode(s): %s\n" "$network_modes"
fi
else
echo "Unable to fetch task metadata (check ECS_CONTAINER_METADATA_URI)."
fi
echo ""
fi
print_3title "IMDS reachability from this task"
imds_token=""
imds_roles=""
imds_http_code=""
imds_tool=""
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
imds_tool="curl"
elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then
imds_tool="wget"
fi
if [ "$imds_tool" = "curl" ]; then
imds_token=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 --max-time 2 -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$imds_token" ]; then
printf "[!] IMDSv2 token request succeeded (metadata reachable from this task).\n"
imds_roles=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 --max-time 2 -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $imds_token" "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ "$imds_roles" ]; then
printf " Instance profile role(s) exposed via IMDS: %s\n" "$imds_roles"
first_role=$(printf "%s" "$imds_roles" | awk '{print $1}')
if [ "$first_role" ]; then
printf " Example: curl -H 'X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: <TOKEN>' http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/%s\n" "$first_role"
fi
else
printf " No IAM role names returned (instance profile might be missing).\n"
fi
else
imds_http_code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 2 --max-time 2 "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" 2>/dev/null)
case "$imds_http_code" in
000|"")
printf "[i] IMDS endpoint did not respond (likely blocked via hop-limit or host firewalling).\n"
;;
401)
printf "[i] IMDS requires v2 tokens but token requests are being blocked (bridge-mode tasks rely on this when hop limit = 1).\n"
;;
*)
printf "[i] IMDS GET returned HTTP %s (investigate host configuration).\n" "$imds_http_code"
;;
esac
fi
elif [ "$imds_tool" = "wget" ]; then
imds_token=$(wget -q -O - --timeout=2 --tries=1 --method=PUT --header="X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$imds_token" ]; then
printf "[!] IMDSv2 token request succeeded (metadata reachable from this task).\n"
imds_roles=$(wget -q -O - --timeout=2 --tries=1 --header="X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $imds_token" "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ "$imds_roles" ]; then
printf " Instance profile role(s) exposed via IMDS: %s\n" "$imds_roles"
else
printf " No IAM role names returned (instance profile might be missing).\n"
fi
else
wget --server-response -O /dev/null --timeout=2 --tries=1 "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" 2>&1 | awk 'BEGIN{code=""} /^ HTTP/{code=$2} END{ if(code!="") { printf("[i] IMDS GET returned HTTP %s (token could not be retrieved).\n", code); } else { print "[i] IMDS endpoint did not respond (likely blocked)."; } }'
fi
else
echo "Neither curl nor wget were found, I can't test IMDS reachability."
fi
echo ""
print_3title "ECS agent IMDS settings"
if [ -r "/etc/ecs/ecs.config" ]; then
ecs_block_line=$(grep -E "^ECS_AWSVPC_BLOCK_IMDS=" /etc/ecs/ecs.config 2>/dev/null | tail -n 1)
ecs_host_line=$(grep -E "^ECS_ENABLE_TASK_IAM_ROLE_NETWORK_HOST=" /etc/ecs/ecs.config 2>/dev/null | tail -n 1)
if [ "$ecs_block_line" ]; then
printf "%s\n" "$ecs_block_line"
if echo "$ecs_block_line" | grep -qi "=true"; then
echo " -> awsvpc-mode tasks should be blocked from IMDS by the ECS agent."
else
echo " -> awsvpc-mode tasks can still reach IMDS (set this to true to block)."
fi
else
echo "ECS_AWSVPC_BLOCK_IMDS not set (awsvpc tasks inherit host IMDS reachability)."
fi
if [ "$ecs_host_line" ]; then
printf "%s\n" "$ecs_host_line"
if echo "$ecs_host_line" | grep -qi "=false"; then
echo " -> Host-network tasks lose IAM task roles but IMDS is blocked."
else
echo " -> Host-network tasks keep IAM task roles and retain IMDS access."
fi
else
echo "ECS_ENABLE_TASK_IAM_ROLE_NETWORK_HOST not set (defaults keep IMDS reachable for host-mode tasks)."
fi
else
echo "Cannot read /etc/ecs/ecs.config (file missing or permissions denied)."
fi
echo ""
print_3title "DOCKER-USER IMDS filtering"
iptables_cmd=""
if command -v iptables >/dev/null 2>&1; then
iptables_cmd=$(command -v iptables)
elif command -v iptables-nft >/dev/null 2>&1; then
iptables_cmd=$(command -v iptables-nft)
fi
if [ "$iptables_cmd" ]; then
docker_rules=$($iptables_cmd -S DOCKER-USER 2>/dev/null)
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
if [ "$docker_rules" ]; then
echo "$docker_rules"
else
echo "(DOCKER-USER chain exists but no rules were found)"
fi
if echo "$docker_rules" | grep -q "169\\.254\\.169\\.254"; then
echo " -> IMDS traffic is explicitly filtered before Docker NAT."
else
echo " -> No DOCKER-USER rule drops 169.254.169.254 traffic (bridge tasks rely on hop limit or host firewalling)."
fi
else
echo "Unable to read DOCKER-USER chain (missing chain or insufficient permissions)."
fi
else
echo "iptables binary not found; cannot inspect DOCKER-USER chain."
fi
echo ""
fi

View File

@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ winpeas.exe -lolbas #Execute also additional LOLBAS search check
The goal of this project is to search for possible **Privilege Escalation Paths** in Windows environments.
New in this version:
- Detect potential GPO abuse by flagging writable SYSVOL paths for GPOs applied to the current host and by highlighting membership in the "Group Policy Creator Owners" group.
- Flag installed OEM utilities such as ASUS DriverHub, MSI Center, Acer Control Centre and Razer Synapse 4, highlighting writable updater folders and world-accessible pipes tied to recent CVEs.
It should take only a **few seconds** to execute almost all the checks and **some seconds/minutes during the lasts checks searching for known filenames** that could contain passwords (the time depened on the number of files in your home folder). By default only **some** filenames that could contain credentials are searched, you can use the **searchall** parameter to search all the list (this could will add some minutes).
The tool is based on **[SeatBelt](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt)**.

View File

@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
new SystemCheck("activedirectoryinfo", new ActiveDirectoryInfo()),
new SystemCheck("cloudinfo", new CloudInfo()),
new SystemCheck("windowscreds", new WindowsCreds()),
new SystemCheck("registryinfo", new RegistryInfo()),
new SystemCheck("browserinfo", new BrowserInfo()),
new SystemCheck("filesinfo", new FilesInfo()),
new SystemCheck("fileanalysis", new FileAnalysis()),

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using winPEAS.Helpers;
using winPEAS.Helpers.Registry;
namespace winPEAS.Checks
{
internal class RegistryInfo : ISystemCheck
{
private const string TypingInsightsRelativePath = @"Software\Microsoft\Input\TypingInsights";
private static readonly string[] KnownWritableSystemKeyCandidates = new[]
{
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CoreShell",
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM",
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Input\Locales",
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Input\Settings",
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Shell\Oobe",
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Shell\Session",
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing",
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateApi",
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsUpdate\UX",
@"SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\DRM",
@"SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Tracing",
@"SYSTEM\Software\Microsoft\TIP",
@"SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Cryptography\WebSignIn\Navigation",
@"SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\StringCacheSettings",
@"SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\USB\AutomaticSurpriseRemoval",
@"SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\BTAGService\Parameters\Settings",
};
private static readonly string[] ScanBasePaths = new[]
{
@"SOFTWARE\Microsoft",
@"SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft",
@"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services",
@"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control",
@"SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control",
};
public void PrintInfo(bool isDebug)
{
Beaprint.GreatPrint("Registry permissions for hive exploitation");
new List<Action>
{
PrintTypingInsightsPermissions,
PrintKnownSystemWritableKeys,
PrintHeuristicWritableKeys,
}.ForEach(action => CheckRunner.Run(action, isDebug));
}
private void PrintTypingInsightsPermissions()
{
Beaprint.MainPrint("Cross-user TypingInsights key (HKCU/HKU)");
var matches = new List<RegistryWritableKeyInfo>();
var seen = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
if (RegistryAclScanner.TryGetWritableKey("HKCU", TypingInsightsRelativePath, out var currentUserKey))
{
if (seen.Add(currentUserKey.FullPath))
{
matches.Add(currentUserKey);
}
}
foreach (var sid in RegistryHelper.GetUserSIDs())
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(sid) || sid.Equals(".DEFAULT", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || sid.EndsWith("_Classes", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
continue;
}
string relativePath = $"{sid}\\{TypingInsightsRelativePath}";
if (RegistryAclScanner.TryGetWritableKey("HKU", relativePath, out var info) && seen.Add(info.FullPath))
{
matches.Add(info);
}
}
if (matches.Count == 0)
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] TypingInsights key does not grant write access to low-privileged groups.");
return;
}
PrintEntries(matches);
Beaprint.LinkPrint("https://projectzero.google/2025/05/the-windows-registry-adventure-8-exploitation.html", "Writable TypingInsights enables cross-user hive tampering and DoS.");
}
private void PrintKnownSystemWritableKeys()
{
Beaprint.MainPrint("Known HKLM descendants writable by standard users");
var matches = new List<RegistryWritableKeyInfo>();
foreach (var path in KnownWritableSystemKeyCandidates)
{
if (RegistryAclScanner.TryGetWritableKey("HKLM", path, out var info))
{
matches.Add(info);
}
}
if (matches.Count == 0)
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] None of the tracked HKLM keys are writable by low-privileged groups.");
return;
}
PrintEntries(matches);
}
private void PrintHeuristicWritableKeys()
{
Beaprint.MainPrint("Sample of additional writable HKLM keys (depth-limited scan)");
var matches = RegistryAclScanner.ScanWritableKeys("HKLM", ScanBasePaths, maxDepth: 3, maxResults: 25);
if (matches.Count == 0)
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [-] No additional writable HKLM keys were found within the sampled paths.");
return;
}
PrintEntries(matches);
Beaprint.GrayPrint(" [*] Showing up to 25 entries from the sampled paths to avoid noisy output.");
}
private static void PrintEntries(IEnumerable<RegistryWritableKeyInfo> entries)
{
foreach (var entry in entries)
{
var principals = string.Join(", ", entry.Principals);
var rights = entry.Rights.Count > 0 ? string.Join(", ", entry.Rights.Distinct(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) : "Write access";
var displayPath = string.IsNullOrEmpty(entry.FullPath) ? $"{entry.Hive}\\{entry.RelativePath}" : entry.FullPath;
Beaprint.BadPrint($" [!] {displayPath} -> {principals} ({rights})");
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
PrintModifiableServices,
PrintWritableRegServices,
PrintPathDllHijacking,
PrintOemPrivilegedUtilities,
PrintLegacySignedKernelDrivers,
PrintKernelQuickIndicators,
}.ForEach(action => CheckRunner.Run(action, isDebug));
@@ -210,6 +211,51 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
}
}
void PrintOemPrivilegedUtilities()
{
try
{
Beaprint.MainPrint("OEM privileged utilities & risky components");
var findings = OemSoftwareHelper.GetPotentiallyVulnerableComponents(Checks.CurrentUserSiDs);
if (findings.Count == 0)
{
Beaprint.GoodPrint(" None of the supported OEM utilities were detected.");
return;
}
foreach (var finding in findings)
{
bool hasCves = finding.Cves != null && finding.Cves.Length > 0;
string cveSuffix = hasCves ? $" ({string.Join(", ", finding.Cves)})" : string.Empty;
Beaprint.BadPrint($" {finding.Name}{cveSuffix}");
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(finding.Description))
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint($" {finding.Description}");
}
foreach (var evidence in finding.Evidence)
{
string message = $" - {evidence.Message}";
if (evidence.Highlight)
{
Beaprint.BadPrint(message);
}
else
{
Beaprint.GrayPrint(message);
}
}
Beaprint.PrintLineSeparator();
}
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
Beaprint.PrintException(ex.Message);
}
}
void PrintLegacySignedKernelDrivers()
{
@@ -352,4 +398,3 @@ namespace winPEAS.Checks
}
}
}

View File

@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ namespace winPEAS.Helpers
Console.WriteLine(LCYAN + " activedirectoryinfo" + GRAY + " Quick AD checks (gMSA readable passwords, AD CS template rights)" + NOCOLOR);
Console.WriteLine(LCYAN + " cloudinfo" + GRAY + " Enumerate cloud information" + NOCOLOR);
Console.WriteLine(LCYAN + " windowscreds" + GRAY + " Search windows credentials" + NOCOLOR);
Console.WriteLine(LCYAN + " registryinfo" + GRAY + " Flag writable HKLM/HKU keys that enable hive tampering" + NOCOLOR);
Console.WriteLine(LCYAN + " browserinfo" + GRAY + " Search browser information" + NOCOLOR);
Console.WriteLine(LCYAN + " filesinfo" + GRAY + " Search generic files that can contains credentials" + NOCOLOR);
Console.WriteLine(LCYAN + " fileanalysis" + GRAY + " [NOT RUN BY DEFAULT] Search specific files that can contains credentials and for regexes inside files. Might take several minutes." + NOCOLOR);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
using Microsoft.Win32;
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Security.AccessControl;
using System.Security.Principal;
using winPEAS.Helpers;
namespace winPEAS.Helpers.Registry
{
internal class RegistryWritableKeyInfo
{
public string Hive { get; set; }
public string RelativePath { get; set; }
public string FullPath { get; set; }
public List<string> Principals { get; set; } = new List<string>();
public List<string> Rights { get; set; } = new List<string>();
}
internal static class RegistryAclScanner
{
private static readonly Dictionary<string, string> LowPrivSidMap = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
{
{ new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.BuiltinUsersSid, null).Value, "BUILTIN\\Users" },
{ new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.AuthenticatedUserSid, null).Value, "Authenticated Users" },
{ new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.WorldSid, null).Value, "Everyone" },
{ new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.InteractiveSid, null).Value, "Interactive" },
{ new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.BuiltinGuestsSid, null).Value, "BUILTIN\\Guests" },
};
public static bool TryGetWritableKey(string hive, string relativePath, out RegistryWritableKeyInfo info)
{
info = null;
using (var key = OpenKey(hive, relativePath))
{
if (key == null)
{
return false;
}
return TryCollectWritableInfo(hive, relativePath, key, out info);
}
}
public static List<RegistryWritableKeyInfo> ScanWritableKeys(string hive, IEnumerable<string> basePaths, int maxDepth, int maxResults)
{
var results = new List<RegistryWritableKeyInfo>();
var seenPaths = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
foreach (var basePath in basePaths ?? Enumerable.Empty<string>())
{
if (results.Count >= maxResults)
{
break;
}
using (var key = OpenKey(hive, basePath))
{
if (key == null)
{
continue;
}
Traverse(hive, key, basePath, 0, maxDepth, maxResults, seenPaths, results);
}
}
return results;
}
private static void Traverse(string hive, RegistryKey currentKey, string currentPath, int depth, int maxDepth, int maxResults, HashSet<string> seenPaths, List<RegistryWritableKeyInfo> results)
{
if (currentKey == null || results.Count >= maxResults)
{
return;
}
if (TryCollectWritableInfo(hive, currentPath, currentKey, out var info))
{
if (seenPaths.Add(info.FullPath))
{
results.Add(info);
}
if (results.Count >= maxResults)
{
return;
}
}
if (depth >= maxDepth)
{
return;
}
string[] subKeys;
try
{
subKeys = currentKey.GetSubKeyNames();
}
catch
{
return;
}
foreach (var subKeyName in subKeys)
{
if (results.Count >= maxResults)
{
break;
}
try
{
using (var childKey = currentKey.OpenSubKey(subKeyName))
{
if (childKey == null)
{
continue;
}
string childPath = string.IsNullOrEmpty(currentPath) ? subKeyName : $"{currentPath}\\{subKeyName}";
Traverse(hive, childKey, childPath, depth + 1, maxDepth, maxResults, seenPaths, results);
}
}
catch
{
// Ignore keys we cannot open
}
}
}
private static bool TryCollectWritableInfo(string hive, string relativePath, RegistryKey key, out RegistryWritableKeyInfo info)
{
info = null;
try
{
var acl = key.GetAccessControl(AccessControlSections.Access);
var principals = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
var rights = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
foreach (RegistryAccessRule rule in acl.GetAccessRules(true, true, typeof(SecurityIdentifier)))
{
if (rule.AccessControlType != AccessControlType.Allow)
{
continue;
}
var sid = rule.IdentityReference as SecurityIdentifier ?? rule.IdentityReference.Translate(typeof(SecurityIdentifier)) as SecurityIdentifier;
if (sid == null)
{
continue;
}
if (!LowPrivSidMap.TryGetValue(sid.Value, out var label))
{
continue;
}
string interestingRight = PermissionsHelper.PermInt2Str((int)rule.RegistryRights, PermissionType.WRITEABLE_OR_EQUIVALENT_REG);
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(interestingRight))
{
continue;
}
principals.Add($"{label} ({sid.Value})");
rights.Add(interestingRight);
}
if (principals.Count == 0)
{
return false;
}
string normalizedRelativePath = relativePath ?? string.Empty;
string fullPath = string.IsNullOrEmpty(normalizedRelativePath) ? key.Name : $"{hive}\\{normalizedRelativePath}";
info = new RegistryWritableKeyInfo
{
Hive = hive,
RelativePath = normalizedRelativePath,
FullPath = fullPath,
Principals = principals.ToList(),
Rights = rights.ToList(),
};
return true;
}
catch
{
return false;
}
}
private static RegistryKey OpenKey(string hive, string path)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(path))
{
return null;
}
try
{
RegistryKey baseKey = hive switch
{
"HKLM" => Microsoft.Win32.Registry.LocalMachine,
"HKCU" => Microsoft.Win32.Registry.CurrentUser,
"HKU" => Microsoft.Win32.Registry.Users,
_ => null,
};
return baseKey?.OpenSubKey(path);
}
catch
{
return null;
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.IO;
using System.Security.AccessControl;
using System.Security.Principal;
using System.ServiceProcess;
using winPEAS.Helpers;
namespace winPEAS.Info.ServicesInfo
{
internal static class OemSoftwareHelper
{
internal static List<OemSoftwareFinding> GetPotentiallyVulnerableComponents(Dictionary<string, string> currentUserSids)
{
var findings = new List<OemSoftwareFinding>();
var services = GetServiceSnapshot();
var processes = GetProcessSnapshot();
foreach (var definition in GetDefinitions())
{
var finding = new OemSoftwareFinding
{
Name = definition.Name,
Description = definition.Description,
Cves = definition.Cves,
};
AppendServiceEvidence(definition, services, finding);
AppendProcessEvidence(definition, processes, finding);
AppendPathEvidence(definition, currentUserSids, finding);
AppendPipeEvidence(definition, finding);
if (finding.Evidence.Count > 0)
{
findings.Add(finding);
}
}
return findings;
}
private static void AppendServiceEvidence(OemComponentDefinition definition, List<ServiceSnapshot> services, OemSoftwareFinding finding)
{
if (definition.ServiceHints == null || definition.ServiceHints.Length == 0)
{
return;
}
foreach (var serviceHint in definition.ServiceHints)
{
foreach (var service in services)
{
if (ContainsIgnoreCase(service.Name, serviceHint) ||
ContainsIgnoreCase(service.DisplayName, serviceHint))
{
finding.Evidence.Add(new OemEvidence
{
EvidenceType = "service",
Highlight = true,
Message = $"Service '{service.Name}' (Display: {service.DisplayName}) matches indicator '{serviceHint}'"
});
}
}
}
}
private static void AppendProcessEvidence(OemComponentDefinition definition, List<ProcessSnapshot> processes, OemSoftwareFinding finding)
{
if (definition.ProcessHints == null || definition.ProcessHints.Length == 0)
{
return;
}
foreach (var processHint in definition.ProcessHints)
{
foreach (var process in processes)
{
bool matchesName = ContainsIgnoreCase(process.Name, processHint);
bool matchesPath = ContainsIgnoreCase(process.FullPath, processHint);
if (matchesName || matchesPath)
{
var location = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(process.FullPath) ? "Unknown" : process.FullPath;
finding.Evidence.Add(new OemEvidence
{
EvidenceType = "process",
Highlight = true,
Message = $"Process '{process.Name}' (Path: {location}) matches indicator '{processHint}'"
});
}
}
}
}
private static void AppendPathEvidence(OemComponentDefinition definition, Dictionary<string, string> currentUserSids, OemSoftwareFinding finding)
{
if ((definition.DirectoryHints == null || definition.DirectoryHints.Length == 0) &&
(definition.FileHints == null || definition.FileHints.Length == 0))
{
return;
}
if (definition.DirectoryHints != null)
{
foreach (var dirHint in definition.DirectoryHints)
{
var expandedPath = ExpandPath(dirHint.Path);
if (!Directory.Exists(expandedPath))
{
continue;
}
var permissions = PermissionsHelper.GetPermissionsFolder(expandedPath, currentUserSids, PermissionType.WRITEABLE_OR_EQUIVALENT);
bool isWritable = permissions.Count > 0;
finding.Evidence.Add(new OemEvidence
{
EvidenceType = "path",
Highlight = isWritable,
Message = BuildPathMessage(expandedPath, dirHint.Description, isWritable, permissions)
});
}
}
if (definition.FileHints != null)
{
foreach (var fileHint in definition.FileHints)
{
var expandedPath = ExpandPath(fileHint);
if (!File.Exists(expandedPath))
{
continue;
}
var permissions = PermissionsHelper.GetPermissionsFile(expandedPath, currentUserSids, PermissionType.WRITEABLE_OR_EQUIVALENT);
bool isWritable = permissions.Count > 0;
finding.Evidence.Add(new OemEvidence
{
EvidenceType = "file",
Highlight = isWritable,
Message = BuildPathMessage(expandedPath, "file", isWritable, permissions)
});
}
}
}
private static void AppendPipeEvidence(OemComponentDefinition definition, OemSoftwareFinding finding)
{
if (definition.PipeHints == null)
{
return;
}
foreach (var pipeHint in definition.PipeHints)
{
try
{
var path = $"\\\\.\\pipe\\{pipeHint.Name}";
var security = File.GetAccessControl(path);
string sddl = security.GetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm(AccessControlSections.All);
string identity = string.Empty;
string rights = string.Empty;
bool worldWritable = false;
if (pipeHint.CheckWorldWritable)
{
worldWritable = HasWorldWritableAce(security, out identity, out rights);
}
string details = worldWritable
? $"Named pipe '{pipeHint.Name}' ({pipeHint.Description}) is writable by {identity} ({rights})."
: $"Named pipe '{pipeHint.Name}' ({pipeHint.Description}) present. SDDL: {sddl}";
finding.Evidence.Add(new OemEvidence
{
EvidenceType = "pipe",
Highlight = worldWritable,
Message = details
});
}
catch (FileNotFoundException)
{
// Pipe not present.
}
catch (DirectoryNotFoundException)
{
// Pipe namespace not accessible.
}
catch (Exception)
{
// Best effort: pipes might disappear during enumeration or deny access.
}
}
}
private static List<ServiceSnapshot> GetServiceSnapshot()
{
var services = new List<ServiceSnapshot>();
try
{
foreach (var service in ServiceController.GetServices())
{
services.Add(new ServiceSnapshot
{
Name = service.ServiceName ?? string.Empty,
DisplayName = service.DisplayName ?? string.Empty
});
}
}
catch (Exception)
{
// Ignore - this is best effort.
}
return services;
}
private static List<ProcessSnapshot> GetProcessSnapshot()
{
var processes = new List<ProcessSnapshot>();
try
{
foreach (var process in Process.GetProcesses())
{
string fullPath = string.Empty;
try
{
fullPath = process.MainModule?.FileName ?? string.Empty;
}
catch
{
// Access denied or 64-bit vs 32-bit mismatch.
}
processes.Add(new ProcessSnapshot
{
Name = process.ProcessName ?? string.Empty,
FullPath = fullPath ?? string.Empty
});
}
}
catch (Exception)
{
// Ignore - enumeration is best effort.
}
return processes;
}
private static string ExpandPath(string rawPath)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(rawPath))
{
return string.Empty;
}
var expanded = Environment.ExpandEnvironmentVariables(rawPath);
return expanded.Trim().Trim('"');
}
private static string BuildPathMessage(string path, string description, bool isWritable, List<string> permissions)
{
string descriptor = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(description) ? "" : $" ({description})";
if (isWritable)
{
return $"Path '{path}'{descriptor} is writable by current user: {string.Join(", ", permissions)}";
}
return $"Path '{path}'{descriptor} detected.";
}
private static bool ContainsIgnoreCase(string value, string toFind)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value) || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(toFind))
{
return false;
}
return value.IndexOf(toFind, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) >= 0;
}
private static bool HasWorldWritableAce(FileSecurity security, out string identity, out string rights)
{
identity = string.Empty;
rights = string.Empty;
try
{
var rules = security.GetAccessRules(true, true, typeof(SecurityIdentifier));
foreach (FileSystemAccessRule rule in rules)
{
if (rule.AccessControlType != AccessControlType.Allow)
{
continue;
}
if (rule.IdentityReference is SecurityIdentifier sid)
{
bool isWorld = sid.IsWellKnown(WellKnownSidType.WorldSid);
bool isAuthenticated = sid.IsWellKnown(WellKnownSidType.AuthenticatedUserSid);
if (!isWorld && !isAuthenticated)
{
continue;
}
const FileSystemRights interestingRights =
FileSystemRights.FullControl |
FileSystemRights.Modify |
FileSystemRights.Write |
FileSystemRights.WriteData |
FileSystemRights.CreateFiles |
FileSystemRights.ChangePermissions;
if ((rule.FileSystemRights & interestingRights) != 0)
{
identity = isWorld ? "Everyone" : "Authenticated Users";
rights = rule.FileSystemRights.ToString();
return true;
}
}
}
}
catch
{
// Ignore parsing issues.
}
return false;
}
private static IEnumerable<OemComponentDefinition> GetDefinitions()
{
return new List<OemComponentDefinition>
{
new OemComponentDefinition
{
Name = "ASUS DriverHub",
Description = "Local web API exposed by ADU.exe allowed bypassing origin/url validation and signature checks.",
Cves = new[] { "CVE-2025-3462", "CVE-2025-3463" },
ServiceHints = new[] { "asusdriverhub", "asus driverhub" },
ProcessHints = new[] { "adu", "asusdriverhub" },
DirectoryHints = new[]
{
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramFiles%\\ASUS\\AsusDriverHub", Description = "Program Files" },
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramFiles(x86)%\\ASUS\\AsusDriverHub", Description = "Program Files (x86)" },
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramData%\\ASUS\\AsusDriverHub\\SupportTemp", Description = "SupportTemp updater staging" }
},
FileHints = new[]
{
"%ProgramData%\\ASUS\\AsusDriverHub\\SupportTemp\\Installer.json"
}
},
new OemComponentDefinition
{
Name = "MSI Center",
Description = "MSI.CentralServer.exe exposed TCP commands with TOCTOU and signature bypass issues.",
Cves = new[] { "CVE-2025-27812", "CVE-2025-27813" },
ServiceHints = new[] { "msi.center", "msi centralserver" },
ProcessHints = new[] { "msi.centralserver", "msi center" },
DirectoryHints = new[]
{
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramFiles%\\MSI\\MSI Center", Description = "Main installation" },
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramFiles(x86)%\\MSI\\MSI Center", Description = "Main installation (x86)" },
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramData%\\MSI\\MSI Center", Description = "Shared data" },
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramData%\\MSI Center SDK", Description = "SDK temp copy location" }
}
},
new OemComponentDefinition
{
Name = "Acer Control Centre",
Description = "ACCSvc.exe exposes treadstone_service_LightMode named pipe with weak impersonation controls.",
Cves = new[] { "CVE-2025-5491" },
ServiceHints = new[] { "accsvc", "acer control" },
ProcessHints = new[] { "accsvc", "accstd" },
DirectoryHints = new[]
{
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramFiles%\\Acer\\Care Center", Description = "Install directory" },
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramFiles(x86)%\\Acer\\Care Center", Description = "Install directory (x86)" }
},
PipeHints = new[]
{
new PipeHint { Name = "treadstone_service_LightMode", Description = "Command dispatcher", CheckWorldWritable = true }
}
},
new OemComponentDefinition
{
Name = "Razer Synapse 4 Elevation Service",
Description = "razer_elevation_service.exe exposes COM elevation helpers that allowed arbitrary process launch.",
Cves = new[] { "CVE-2025-27811" },
ServiceHints = new[] { "razer_elevation_service" },
ProcessHints = new[] { "razer_elevation_service" },
DirectoryHints = new[]
{
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramFiles%\\Razer\\RazerAppEngine", Description = "Razer App Engine" },
new PathHint { Path = "%ProgramFiles(x86)%\\Razer\\RazerAppEngine", Description = "Razer App Engine (x86)" }
}
}
};
}
private class ServiceSnapshot
{
public string Name { get; set; }
public string DisplayName { get; set; }
}
private class ProcessSnapshot
{
public string Name { get; set; }
public string FullPath { get; set; }
}
private class OemComponentDefinition
{
public string Name { get; set; }
public string Description { get; set; }
public string[] Cves { get; set; } = Array.Empty<string>();
public string[] ServiceHints { get; set; } = Array.Empty<string>();
public string[] ProcessHints { get; set; } = Array.Empty<string>();
public PathHint[] DirectoryHints { get; set; } = Array.Empty<PathHint>();
public string[] FileHints { get; set; } = Array.Empty<string>();
public PipeHint[] PipeHints { get; set; } = Array.Empty<PipeHint>();
}
private class PathHint
{
public string Path { get; set; }
public string Description { get; set; }
}
private class PipeHint
{
public string Name { get; set; }
public string Description { get; set; }
public bool CheckWorldWritable { get; set; }
}
}
internal class OemSoftwareFinding
{
public string Name { get; set; }
public string Description { get; set; }
public string[] Cves { get; set; } = Array.Empty<string>();
public List<OemEvidence> Evidence { get; } = new List<OemEvidence>();
}
internal class OemEvidence
{
public string EvidenceType { get; set; }
public string Message { get; set; }
public bool Highlight { get; set; }
}
}

View File

@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@
<Compile Include="Checks\SystemInfo.cs" />
<Compile Include="Checks\UserInfo.cs" />
<Compile Include="Checks\WindowsCreds.cs" />
<Compile Include="Checks\RegistryInfo.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\AppLocker\AppLockerHelper.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\AppLocker\AppLockerRules.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\AppLocker\IAppIdPolicyHandler.cs" />
@@ -1462,12 +1463,14 @@
<DependentUpon>Resources.resx</DependentUpon>
</Compile>
<Compile Include="Info\ServicesInfo\ServicesInfoHelper.cs" />
<Compile Include="Info\ServicesInfo\OemSoftwareHelper.cs" />
<Compile Include="Info\SystemInfo\SystemInfo.cs" />
<Compile Include="Info\UserInfo\UserInfoHelper.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\DomainHelper.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\CheckRunner.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\ReflectionHelper.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\Registry\RegistryHelper.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\Registry\RegistryAclScanner.cs" />
<Compile Include="Helpers\Search\SearchHelper.cs" />
<Compile Include="Wifi\Wifi.cs" />
<Compile Include="Wifi\NativeWifiApi\Interop.cs" />